

I. Kant, Perpetual Peace + other
Essays, to. T. H. Humphrey.

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Notes for
Idea for a Universal History
with a Cosmopolitan Intent

References to essays in this volume are to page numbers in the *margins*.

1. A. A., VIII 15–31. This essay first appeared in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, November, 1784. The relevant portion of the notice reads: “One of Professor Kant’s cherished ideas is that the ultimate end of the human race is the attainment of the most perfect civil constitution; and he wishes that a philosophical historian might undertake to give us a history of mankind from this perspective and to point out the extent to which humanity has at different times approached or distanced itself from this end, as well as what is still to be done to attain it.” *Gothaische Gelehrte Zeitung*, 1784 (12th Issue, Feb. 11), p. 95.

2. In this essay Kant seems to use the term “*Gattung*,” species, in relation to mankind in those contexts where he wants to consider him only as one natural creature among others.

3. See *Theory and Practice*, 310 and *Perpetual Peace*, 365.

4. See *Spec. Beg. Human History*, p. 110.

5. See Translator’s Introduction, p. 16–17, n. 13.

6. See Note on the Text, p. 26.

7. See Note on the Text, p. 26.

8. The Amphyctyonic League was originally a federation of twelve Greek tribes to protect a religious shrine, especially the shrine at Delphi. Philip II of Macedon used the League to sanction his wars of conquest as sacred wars.

9. Abbé Charles-Irénée Castel de St. Pierre (1658–1743), *Projet de paix perpétuelle*, Utrecht, 1713.

10. J.-J. Rousseau, *Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle d. M. l’Abbé de St. Pierre*, 1760. See *Spec. Beg. Human History*, 110.

11. See *Perpetual Peace*, 345–46.

12. See Note on the Text, p. 26.

13. “Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations” in David Hume, *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary*, ed. Green and Grose, vol. I, p. 414.

14. See *End of All Things*, 336–38.

Kant

An Answer to the Question:
*What is Enlightenment?*¹
(1784)

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*Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity.*² *Immaturity* is the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is *self-imposed* when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. *Sapere Aude!*³ “Have courage to use your own understanding!”—that is the motto of enlightenment.

Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a proportion of men, long after nature has released them from alien guidance (*naturaliter maiorennes*),⁴ nonetheless gladly remain in lifelong immaturity, and why it is so easy for others to establish themselves as their guardians. It is so easy to be immature. If I have a book to serve as my understanding, a pastor to serve as my conscience, a physician to determine my diet for me, and so on, I need not exert myself at all. I need not think, if only I can pay: others will readily undertake the irksome work for me. The guardians who have so benevolently taken over the supervision of men have carefully seen to it that the far greatest part of them (including the entire fair sex) regard taking the step to maturity as very dangerous, not to mention difficult. Having first made their domestic livestock dumb, and having carefully made sure that these docile creatures will not take a single step without the go-cart to which they are harnessed, these guardians then show them the danger that threatens them, should they attempt to walk alone. Now this danger is not actually so great, for after falling a few times they would in the end certainly learn to walk; but an example of this kind makes men timid and usually frightens them out of all further attempts.

Thus, it is difficult for any individual man to work himself out of the immaturity that has all but become his nature. He has even become fond of this state and for the time being is actually incapable of using his own understanding, for no one has ever allowed him to attempt it. Rules and formulas, those mechanical aids to the rational use, or rather misuse, of his natural gifts, are the shackles of a permanent immaturity. Whoever threw them off would still make only an uncertain leap over the smallest ditch, since he is unaccustomed to this kind of free movement. Consequently, only a few have succeeded, by cultivating their own minds, in freeing themselves from immaturity and pursuing a secure course.

But that the public should enlighten itself is more likely; indeed, if it

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is only allowed freedom, enlightenment is almost inevitable. For even among the entrenched guardians of the great masses a few will always think for themselves, a few who, after having themselves thrown off the yoke of immaturity, will spread the spirit of a rational appreciation for both their own worth and for each person's calling to think for himself. But it should be particularly noted that if a public that was first placed in this yoke by the guardians is suitably aroused by some of those who are altogether incapable of enlightenment, it may force the guardians themselves to remain under the yoke—so pernicious is it to instill prejudices, for they finally take revenge upon their originators, or on their descendants. Thus a public can only attain enlightenment slowly. Perhaps a revolution can overthrow autocratic despotism and profiteering or power-grabbing oppression, but it can never truly reform a manner of thinking;⁵ instead, new prejudices, just like the old ones they replace, will serve as a leash for the great unthinking mass.

Nothing is required for this enlightenment, however, except *freedom*; and the freedom in question is the least harmful of all, namely, the freedom to use reason *publicly* in all matters. But on all sides I hear: “*Do not argue!*” The officer says, “Do not argue, drill!” The taxman says, “Do not argue, pay!” The pastor says, “Do not argue, believe!” (Only one ruler in the world⁶ says, “*Argue* as much as you want and about what you want, *but obey!*”) In this we have [examples of] pervasive restrictions on freedom. But which restriction hinders enlightenment and which does not, but instead actually advances it? I reply: The *public* use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among mankind; the *private* use of reason may, however, often be very narrowly restricted, without otherwise hindering the progress of enlightenment. By the public use of one's own reason I understand the use that anyone as a *scholar* makes of reason before the entire *literate world*. I call the private use of reason that which a person may make in a *civic post* or office that has been entrusted to him.⁷ Now in many affairs conducted in the interests of a community, a certain mechanism is required by means of which some of its members must conduct themselves in an entirely passive manner so that through an artificial unanimity the government may guide them toward public ends, or at least prevent them from destroying such ends. Here one certainly must not argue, instead one must obey. However, insofar as this part of the machine also regards himself as a member of the community as a whole, or even of the world community, and as a consequence addresses the public in the role of a scholar, in the proper sense of that term, he can most certainly argue, without thereby harming the affairs for which as a passive member he is partly responsible. Thus it would be disastrous if an officer on duty who was given a command by his superior were to question the appropriateness or utility of the order. He must obey. But as a scholar he cannot be justly constrained from making comments about

errors in military service, or from placing them before the public for its judgment. The citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposed on him; indeed, impertinent criticism of such levies, when they should be paid by him, can be punished as a scandal (since it can lead to widespread insubordination). But the same person does not act contrary to civic duty when, as a scholar, he publicly expresses his thoughts regarding the impropriety or even injustice of such taxes. Likewise a pastor is bound to instruct his catechumens and congregation in accordance with the symbol of the church he serves, for he was appointed on that condition. But as a scholar he has complete freedom, indeed even the calling, to impart to the public all of his carefully considered and well-intentioned thoughts concerning mistaken aspects of that symbol,⁸ as well as his suggestions for the better arrangement of religious and church matters. Nothing in this can weigh on his conscience. What he teaches in consequence of his office as a servant of the church he sets out as something with regard to which he has no discretion to teach in accord with his own lights; rather, he offers it under the direction and in the name of another. He will say, “Our church teaches this or that and these are the demonstrations it uses.” He thereby extracts for his congregation all practical uses from precepts to which he would not himself subscribe with complete conviction, but whose presentation he can nonetheless undertake, since it is not entirely impossible that truth lies hidden in them, and, in any case, nothing contrary to the very nature of religion is to be found in them. If he believed he could find anything of the latter sort in them, he could not in good conscience serve in his position; he would have to resign. Thus an appointed teacher's use of his reason for the sake of his congregation is merely *private*, because, however large the congregation is, this use is always only domestic; in this regard, as a priest, he is not free and cannot be such because he is acting under instructions from someone else. By contrast, the cleric—as a scholar who speaks through his writings to the public as such, i.e., the world—enjoys in this *public use* of reason an unrestricted freedom to use his own rational capacities and to speak his own mind. For that the (spiritual) guardians of a people should themselves be immature is an absurdity that would insure the perpetuation of absurdities.

But would a society of pastors, perhaps a church assembly or venerable presbytery (as those among the Dutch call themselves), not be justified in binding itself by oath to a certain unalterable symbol in order to secure a constant guardianship over each of its members and through them over the people, and this for all time: I say that this is wholly impossible. Such a contract, whose intention is to preclude forever all further enlightenment of the human race, is absolutely null and void, even if it should be ratified by the supreme power, by parliaments, and by the most solemn peace treaties. One age cannot bind itself, and thus conspire, to place a succeeding one in a condition whereby it would be impossible for the later age to expand its knowl-

edge (particularly where it is so very important), to rid itself of errors, and generally to increase its enlightenment. That would be a crime against human nature, whose essential destiny lies precisely in such progress; subsequent generations are thus completely justified in dismissing such agreements as unauthorized and criminal. The criterion of everything that can be agreed upon as a law by a people lies in this question: Can a people impose such a law on itself?⁹ Now it might be possible, in anticipation of a better state of affairs, to introduce a provisional order for a specific, short time, all the while giving all citizens, especially clergy, in their role as scholars, the freedom to comment publicly, i.e., in writing, on the present institution's shortcomings. The provisional order might last until insight into the nature of these matters had become so widespread and obvious that the combined (if not unanimous) voices of the populace could propose to the crown that it take under its protection those congregations that, in accord with their newly gained insight, had organized themselves under altered religious institutions, but without interfering with those wishing to allow matters to remain as before. However, it is absolutely forbidden that they unite into a religious organization that nobody may for the duration of a man's lifetime publicly question, for so doing would deny, render fruitless, and make detrimental to succeeding generations an era in man's progress toward improvement. A man may put off enlightenment with regard to what he ought to know, though only for a short time and for his own person; but to renounce it for himself, or, even more, for subsequent generations, is to violate and trample man's divine rights underfoot. And what a people may not decree for itself may still less be imposed on it by a monarch, for his lawgiving authority rests on his unification of the people's collective will in his own. If he only sees to it that all genuine or purported improvement is consonant with civil order, he can allow his subjects to do what they find necessary to their spiritual well-being, which is not his affair. However, he must prevent anyone from forcibly interfering with another's working as best he can to determine and promote his well-being. It detracts from his own majesty when he interferes in these matters, since the writings in which his subjects attempt to clarify their insights lend value to his conception of governance. This holds whether he acts from his own highest insight—whereby he calls upon himself the reproach, "*Caesar non est supra grammaticos*."¹⁰—as well as, indeed even more, when he despoils his highest authority by supporting the spiritual despotism of some tyrants in his state over his other subjects.

If it is now asked, "Do we presently live in an *enlightened* age?" the answer is, "No, but we do live in an age of *enlightenment*." As matters now stand, a great deal is still lacking in order for men as a whole to be, or even to put themselves into a position to be able without external guidance to apply understanding confidently to religious issues. But we do have clear indications that the way is now being opened for

men to proceed freely in this direction and that the obstacles to general enlightenment—to their release from their self-imposed immaturity—are gradually diminishing. In this regard, this age is the age of enlightenment, the century of Frederick.¹¹

A prince who does not find it beneath him to say that he takes it to be his *duty* to prescribe nothing, but rather to allow men complete freedom in religious matters—who thereby renounces the arrogant title of *tolerance*—is himself enlightened and deserves to be praised by a grateful present and by posterity as the first, at least where the government is concerned, to release the human race from immaturity and to leave everyone free to use his own reason in all matters of conscience. Under his rule, venerable pastors, in their role as scholars and without prejudice to their official duties, may freely and openly set out for the world's scrutiny their judgments and views, even where these occasionally differ from the accepted symbol. Still greater freedom is afforded to those who are not restricted by an official post. This spirit of freedom is expanding even where it must struggle against the external obstacles of governments that misunderstand their own function. Such governments are illuminated by the example that the existence of freedom need not give cause for the least concern regarding public order and harmony in the commonwealth. If only they refrain from inventing artifices to keep themselves in it, men will gradually raise themselves from barbarism.

I have focused on religious matters in setting out my main point concerning enlightenment, i.e., man's emergence from self-imposed immaturity, first because our rulers have no interest in assuming the role of their subjects' guardians with respect to the arts and sciences, and secondly because that form of immaturity is both the most pernicious and disgraceful of all. But the manner of thinking of a head of state who favors religious enlightenment goes even further, for he realizes that there is no danger to his *legislation* in allowing his subjects to use reason *publicly* and to set before the world their thoughts concerning better formulations of his laws, even if this involves frank criticism of legislation currently in effect. We have before us a shining example, with respect to which no monarch surpasses the one whom we honor.

But only a ruler who is himself enlightened and has no dread of shadows, yet who likewise has a well-disciplined, numerous army to guarantee public peace, can say what no republic¹² may dare, namely: "*Argue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey!*" Here as elsewhere, when things are considered in broad perspective, a strange, unexpected pattern in human affairs reveals itself, one in which almost everything is paradoxical. A greater degree of civil freedom seems advantageous to a people's *spiritual* freedom; yet the former established impassable boundaries for the latter; conversely, a lesser degree of civil freedom provides enough room for all fully to expand their abilities. Thus, once nature has removed the hard shell

42 from this kernel for which she has most fondly cared, namely, the inclination to and vocation for free *thinking*, the kernel gradually reacts on a people's mentality (whereby they become increasingly able to *act freely*), and it finally even influences the principles of *government*, which finds that it can profit by treating men, *who are now more than machines*, in accord with their dignity.*

Königsberg in Prussia, 30 September 1784

I. Kant

*Today I read in Büsching's *Wöchentliche Nachrichten* for September 13th a notice concerning this month's *Berlinischen Monatsschrift* that mentions *Mendelssohn's* answer to this same question. I have not yet seen this journal, otherwise I would have withheld the foregoing reflections, which I now set out in order to see to what extent two person's thoughts may coincidentally agree.

Notes for *What Is Enlightenment?*

References to essays in this volume are to page numbers in the *margins*.

1. A. A., VIII, 33–42. This essay first appeared in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, December, 1784.

2. The German is *Unmündigkeit*, which quite literally means “minority,” where one is referring to the inability to make decisions for oneself. Kant's point in the essay is that by virtue of understanding and reason men have the inherent right and ability to make all intellectual, political and religious decisions for themselves. That they do not is a function of certain, perhaps implicit, choices they make in regard to exercising rights and developing capacities.

3. “Dare to know!” (Horace, *Epodes*, 1, 2, 40.) This motto was adopted by the Society of the Friends of Truth, an important circle of the German Enlightenment.

4. “Those who have come of age by virtue of nature.”

5. The term Kant uses here and later, on p. 41, is *Denkungsart*; it occurs in the second edition preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where he works out his famous analogy of the Copernican Revolution in philosophy, which he refers to as a revolution in the method of thought. (B vii–xxiv) The term refers to one's characteristic pattern of thought, whether it is marked by systematic, rational procedures or by prejudice and superstition, criticism or dogmatism.

6. Frederick II (the Great) of Prussia.

7. See *Theory and Practice*, 304.

8. Kant distinguishes between two classes of concepts, those that we can schematize, i.e., directly represent in experience (intuition), and those that we must symbolize, i.e., indirectly represent in experience (intuition). Symbolized concepts, such as the one we have of God, are those for which no experience can provide adequate content; consequently, experience can only be used to indicate the content we intend. All religious concepts have this character. By symbol in this context, then, Kant means those beliefs and practices in which a group expresses the content of its concept of the divine. (*Crit. Judgment*, 351–54)

9. This would seem a peculiarly political expression of the Categorical Imperative, particularly as it is expressed in *Groundings*, 428–29.

10. "Caesar is not above the grammarians." See *Perpetual Peace*, 368 f.

11. Frederick II (the Great), King of Prussia.

12. The term Kant uses here is *Freistaat*, which is idiomatically translated "republic." However, Kant never again uses this Germanic rooted word in the essays included in this volume. In all the other essays he uses the Latin loan word *Republic*. I point this out because what Kant says here about a *Freistaat* is inconsistent with what he says elsewhere about a *Republic*.

*Speculative Beginning of Human History*¹ (1786)

Surely it is permissible to insert speculations into the *progression* of a history in order to fill out gaps in the reports, because what comes before, as distant cause, and what follows, as effect, can give a fairly reliable clue for discovering the intervening causes so as to make the transition comprehensible. To produce a history entirely from speculations alone seems no better than to sketch a romance. Thus it could not go by the name of *speculative history* but rather only that of *fiction*. Yet, what may not be ventured regarding the progression of the history of human actions, can nonetheless be attempted through speculation regarding their *first beginnings*, as far as these are made by *nature*. For this speculation need not be fictional, but can instead be based on experience, if one presupposes that in their first beginnings these actions were no better or worse than we now find them to be, a presupposition that conforms to the analogy of nature and has no risky consequences. A history of freedom's first development, from its original capacities in the nature of man, is therefore something different from the history of freedom's progression, which can only be based on reports.

However, since speculations may not make too high a claim on one's assent, they must not lay claim to being serious business, but perhaps rather only to being an exercise of the imagination in the company of reason, carried out for the sake of the mind's relaxation and health. Thus, they cannot compare with those histories that, as actual reports whose verification rests on grounds entirely different from the mere philosophy of nature, set out the very same events and are to be believed as such. Because of that, and because I here undertake a mere flight of fancy [*Luftreise*], I may hope to be granted permission to use a holy document as a map and, at the same time, to imagine that my flight—taken on the wings of imagination, though not without a guiding thread by which, through reason, it is tied to experience—follows precisely the same line as is sketched out in that historical document. If the reader will check the pages of that document (Genesis, 2–6), he can see whether the path that philosophy follows by means of concepts coincides every step along the way with the one set out by history.

If one's speculation is not to wander aimlessly, one must make one's beginning something that human reason is utterly incapable of deriving from any previous natural causes, hence, with the *existence of man*. Indeed, one must begin with man as a *fully formed adult*, for he must do without maternal care; one must begin with a *pair*, so that he can propagate his kind; and one must begin with *only a single pair*, so that war does not arise, as it would if men lived close to one another